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book contribute substantially to its admirable quality, as does the emphasis
upon recently decided cases. But though these features heighten student interest,
they can also diminish the opportunity for penetrating analysis and synthesis.
The challenge in future editions would seem to lie in the arrangement of materials, including legislation, for a demanding problem method approach. Some
of this appears in the present revision. A functional theme could be the impact
of many doctrines upon marketability of titles, already undertaken by the
inclusion of adverse possession among methods of title assurance. Likewise,
Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes, Inc.2 2 is such a good case for exhaustive analysis of
the determinable fee that surely it should be postponed to a later chapter for
its relation to recording, title assurance, covenants, and marketable title acts. At
that point, it might illuminate why the Illinois court did so much better in sustaining a statute than the New York court did in striking down a more cautious
statutory approach 2 3
All in all, this edition is a significant improvement of an already excellent
casebook. As noted, there is no drastic change in the coverage of the book; the
reviewer suspects that this reflects the fact that in the field of property we are
just entering a period of heightened legislative control. As a result of this
development, it is too early to undertake thorough revision of our time-honored
methods of teaching the law of property. In any event, the authors have managed
to reflect to some degree the increasing flow of remedial legislation, while at the
same time preserving as many appellate decisions as possible in the curriculum.
Robert E. Parella*

Expanding Liberties: Freedom's Gains in Postwar America. By MILTON
R. KONVITZ. New York: Viking Press. 1966. Pp. xvii, 429. $8.95.
In a course at Yale on writing about law, Fred Rodell tells his class that a book
reviewer is permitted to criticize what the author said about a subject but
is not permitted to object to those things the author did not say, for that would
demand that he should have written a different book. One may have difficulty
in taking issue with the presentation of the post-war growth of some civil and
personal constitutional rights that Professor Konvitz has made in his book because of the validity of what he says. Therefore criticism is necessarily limited
to what the author might have done but did not do. This, however, is not a
demand that he should have written a different book, but merely an assertion
that he should have gone a little further than he went.
The books appears to be an argument for the constitutional views Konvitz
holds and is addressed to those interested in constitutional law. It is not the
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Id. at 121.

Compare Board of Educ. v. Miles, 15 N.Y.2d 364, 207 N.E.2d 181, 259 N.Y.S.2d 129
(1965), 51 Cornell L.Q. 402 (1966), with Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 Il. 2d 486, 130
N.E.2d 111 (1955).
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University Law School.
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neutralist delineation of a constitutional area that lawyers use for research, nor
is it the popular expos6 of law that appeals to the masses. It is a set of ten almost
separate arguments setting forth neither new proposals nor new directions for
constitutional principles, but rather a description of the directions the law has
taken, Konvitz's reasons why the law has taken those directions, and his arguments as to how far the Supreme Court should go in those areas. The arguments
are sometimes legal, sometimes philosophical, sometimes sociological, and sometimes historical. If a picture of the author were not evident from his previous
works, it would be obvious from this book. He is a classical, traditional liberal
who easily espouses the classical causes of liberalism.
As a method of argumentation, Professor Konvitz presents an historical description of the cases decided in the area, pictures the state of the legal development prior to World War II, and then describes, major Supreme Court case by
major Supreme Court case, the growth of the law since World War II.He seems
to think of law in terms of rules and precedents rather than as a process, and
therefore does not view the decisions of the Court as part of a continuum or a
continuous flow. Rather, it would appear that he thinks he is making an argument as to what the Court should do with the next case before it, or what it
should have done about a previous case. Because of this failing he does not lay
out his view of the general areas very clearly. This is evident from the very first
chapter, dealing with religious liberty, in which he proclaims the validity of the
school prayer cases and damns the Sunday closing laws, but does not set forth
what kind of goals and criteria the Supreme Court should utilize in deciding
future first amendment cases. Had he seen law in terms of a continuing process
he might have set forth what the Supreme Court should do with the problems
of religion versus atheism that must arise in the future. However, to set forth
here what the goals should be would be to write the book Konvitz did not
write, and would hardly be the function of a reviewer.
The second chapter deals with freedom of association, a recently written constitutional basic. Here the author sets up the foundations of the freedom of
association and shows how the Court has created a limit in Uphaus v. Wyman.'
However, he criticizes the Uphaus decision on the ground that it "strikes a
discordant note."M Further, he says, "if one keeps before him certain constitutional touchstones, then one can suggest that the Uphaus case was wrongly decided."3 What those "constitutional touchstones" are, he does not say. While
he claims that a free society needs "free men who freely may enter many
smaller free societies,"' 4 Konvitz does not state what associations are not permitted or should not be permitted under our constitution, leaving that aspect
for future speculation as to the "political theories and jurisprudential philosophies of the Justices." 5 On the other hand, Konvitz has spared few words in condemning state investigation of communism as a means of perpetuating segregation and oppressing Negroes.
The third chapter on academic freedom raises slightly different issues in a
slightly different constitutional framework. Here Konvitz describes a constitu1 360 U.S. 72 (1959), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 388 (1960).
2 Konvitz, Expanding Liberties: Freedom's Gains in Post War America 82 (1966).
3 Ibid.
4 Id. at 84.
6 Id. at 85.
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tional idea and ideal. He excoriates those who would stifle the expressions of
different thought or forbid intellectual experimentation to our schools. However,
he admits that a limit to academic freedom exists, at least in terms of the
parochial schools.
The fourth chapter is about the Communist Party and the development of
the special laws and rules that have evolved in relation to it. While Konvitz
does not state it specifically, he leaves no room for doubt that freedom of
association for Negroes in the NAACP means one thing and freedom of association for anyone in the Communist Party means quite another. While he
brings out the distinctions the Court has used in deciding the Communist cases,
the conclusion is inescapable that the criteria used for the Communists are not
the same as the criteria used for the NAACP. Whether Konvitz likes or dislikes
this difference, he does not argue with it but accepts it as right and just.
In the next chapter on censorship and obscenity, again no recommendation
is made as to how the courts should decide future cases. One set of major decisions came out after the book had been written, the Ginzberg,6 Mishkin,7 and
Fanny Hill cases. 8 Konvitz did not take the opportunity to become a prophet.
It is impossible to tell what his position is on the subject of obscenity. He does
not agree with Justices Black and Douglas on the absoluteness of freedom of
speech, nor does he take the opposite position espousing the right of society
to censor that which it considers morally objectionable. His position lies somewhere in between and it is impossible to tell exactly where.
The next three chapters are on civil rights and the legal history of the civil
rights struggle. There is no doubt that Konvitz is in favor of the complete
destruction of all artificial distinctions between American citizens-whether
white, brown, yellow, or red. There can be no legitimate argument with his
position or presentation.
The last part of the book concerns the American position in the international
protection of human rights and might just as well have been left out of the
book, because American inaction and negation not only exhibit a dismal past
but show no promise of a future. The author, no doubt, inserted this section for
completeness, but it adds nothing to the picture of American liberties which
he has drawn.
On the whole the book is well written and interesting, which is rare in books
about law and even rarer in books presenting arguments for legal positions.
Like briefs, such books are not noted for their brevity nor their writing style,
but this volume keeps the reader involved in the story of the post-war development of liberties. I do not hesitate to recommend it as good reading on civil
rights. Unfortunately the book will appeal only to the converted, not to the convertible or unconverted on whom the constitutional arguments might have some
beneficial effect.
Richard Morton*
6 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), 51 Cornell L.Q. 785 (1966).
7 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
8 "Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia.

